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It seems reasonable to say that everything which is valuable has a cost. 
Accordingly, one may conclude that useful information, rational deliberation and 
advantageous transactions are three services which should have a cost just like any other 
services. However, it is well known that, in contrast with more standard services, these 
have been enduringly perceived by most economists, until at least the mid-twentieth 
century, as zero-cost commodities. Buyers and sellers were assumed to get information, 
to deliberate and to negotiate about various kinds of transactions, but no specific cost was 
associated with such activities. Economic agents being assumed to choose what they 
consider the most advantageous to them, it would have been inconceivable in this context 
that these agents would drop the allegedly free benefits drawn from more information, 
more deliberation and more transactions. And, since searching for information, 
deliberating and negotiating can takes a great deal of time (not to mention various other 
correlative expenses) and since it is well known, at least since Benjamin Franklin, that 
‘time is money’, assuming zero-cost for these desired benefits was tantamount to 
assuming that the activities that provide them were accomplished instantaneously. But to 
dispose instantaneously — without devoting any time or other kinds of resource to the 
acquisition of such a commodity — of all the information which might be economically 
relevant  implies that all possible knowledge is already available or, put otherwise, it 
implies omniscience to start with. Similarly, to arrive instantaneously — without 
devoting any time or other kinds of resource to improve any aspect of the process —, on 
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any conceivable occasion, at the decision which would have resulted from a deliberation 
about the respective advantages of all possible alternatives implies perfect and unbounded 
rationality. Finally, to be in position to buy any conceivable kind of commodity at its 
correct price instantaneously — without devoting any time or other kinds of resource to 
negotiation — implies that everything is marketable to start with or, if one prefers, that 
what I will call ‘omnimarketability’ prevails. Accordingly, most traditional economic 
models have been designed in such a way that it describes omniscient and perfectly 
rational agents who are trading an indefinite amount of goods which are all readily 
available for exchange. 
 
Each of these three features of traditional economic models is very well known. 
Rather than discussing further anyone of them in particular, what I would like to do is to 
show that there exists a parallel between the three phenomena involved and to explore to 
what extent they raised similar types of problems for economic analysis. In addition, I 
wish to inquire whether the conclusions drawn from the analysis of any one of these 
phenomena is applicable to the others. This parallel treatment will shed some light on the 
fact that the concept of cost has been increasingly overextended by economists during the 
second half of the 20th century. I will conclude by showing that, while it has made a 
better understanding of the workings of the market possible, the progressive extension of 
this concept, when taken beyond certain limits, tends paradoxically to destroy the very 
meaning of a market economy. 
 
Various kinds of prohibitive  costs 
 
In fact, it was only when concerns were raised about the blatantly unrealistic character of 
each one of all-embracing attributes like omniscience, perfect rationality and 
omnimarketability that economists turned their attention to the specific costs associated 
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with information, deliberation and transaction. For an economist, indeed, if a commodity 
which is desired and considered important is bought in a far too limited quantity to satisfy 
the corresponding need, it is natural to conclude that potential buyers are refrained by a 
prohibitive cost. Thus, when it was pointed out that the prevalence of ignorance makes 
omniscience an extravagant and even preposterous postulate, some economists were 
inclined to conclude that if knowledge and information were severely limited, it was due 
to the prohibitive cost of information. It is true that it is possible to acquire more 
information by taking appropriate means, but such an acquisition imposes costs in money 
and time which can become so high that one can reasonably prefer to live with a limited 
amount of information than to acquire still more of it.2 Similarly, when it was pointed out 
through evidence accumulated in empirical inquiries that people frequently behave in a 
way clearly at odds with what is expected from rational behaviour, some economists were 
led to explore the idea that such apparently irrational behaviour was largely due to the 
prohibitive cost of supplementary deliberation. It is true that it is possible by taking 
appropriate means to improve the quality of the deliberation which precedes important 
decisions, but such an improvement imposes costs in money and time which can become 
so high that one can reasonably prefer to shorten deliberation and be satisfied by the 
situation reached with the help of a ‘bounded’ rationality.3 These two first cases are 
closely related; information and deliberation have complementary functions in the process 
of arriving to the most advantageous situations. They are, however, conceptually quite 
different since information might be complete and not used given limitations affecting the 
required deliberation; conversely, deliberation might be perfect given the limited amount 
of information available. The third case to be considered here seems to be quite different, 
but it is also closely related to the first two. When it was pointed out that externalities were 
pervasive and that there were many things which cannot be bought and sold as marketable 
commodities, some economists concluded that such a resistance to marketability was due 
to the prohibitive cost of transactions. After all, it is possible, by engaging in costly 
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negotiations (like those required by the trade of pollution rights), to transform into 
marketable goods various situations which used to be associated with externalities4. Thus, 
the parallel can be illustrated by the following table.  
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In these three cases, the economists's strategy was the same because the problems 
faced were similar. The core of this strategy was the claim that if real-world markets do 
not work as they should according to the ideal model of the market, this must be due to 
the fact that reaching the optimal point determined by the ideal model is costly and that 
anything which has a cost should not continue to be bought in cases where the benefit of 
an extra unit of it is overwhelmed by the cost incurred by obtaining it. By drawing 
attention to these costs, economists managed to explain the presence of ignorance, of 
irrationality and of externalities in such a way as to render these phenomena no longer a 
challenge to economic theory. Even if economic agents desire to get as much information 
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as they can, the cost of information can be such that it might be preferable to choose to 
remain ignorant to some degree. Even if economic agents tend to arrive at the best 
decision through a deliberation which bears on any relevant aspect of a question, the cost 
of deliberation can be such that it might be just wise to be happy with what a bounded 
rationality suggests (and consequently to take decisions which look irrational from a 
certain point of view). Even if economic agents tend to rely on economic transactions to 
buy any kind of benefits (like protection from pollution), the cost of organising this kind 
of transaction can be so high that it might be advantageous to decide not to buy such 
extremely costly commodities, leaving the market in a situation that old-fashioned 
economists (wrongly) used to present as ‘external’ to the market.  
 
By proceeding this way, economists integrate into an all-embracing potential 
market all these features of the real world (ignorance, irrationality, externalities) which 
made most neoclassical models of the market so unrealistic. To some extent, this strategy 
seems justified. After all, it is true that there exist various kinds of costs. At the beginning 
of the 19th century, most economists were inclined to consider only production costs, but 
this was clearly revealed to be nonsense. How could one not count transportation costs? 
The cost of a commodity available at a given place cannot be the same as the cost of the 
same commodity available at its point of production in a distant country. But if it is so, 
why exclude distribution costs?  The cost of a commodity available in small units at any 
place and at any time cannot be the same as the cost of the same commodity available as 
a part of a large lot only at the factory the day of its production. And what about 
advertising costs? As Stigler claimed (Stigler,1961, pp. 220 and ff.), they should be seen 
as the price (frequently embodied in the market price of the commodity) of an efficient 
and economic transmission of useful information about commodities currently on sale. 
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The further expansion of the notion of cost  
 
However, in order to insure the smooth functioning of a market which would realistically 
make room for the cumbersome features which are kept out of its ideal model, should we 
expand the notion of cost further to include anything which must be paid (be it money, 
time, psychological stress or other resources)? If one accepts this perspective, one can 
even be inclined to include into costs what must be spent in money, time and otherwise 
for physically and juridicaly organising a market for a given commodity. Accordingly, 
one will consider that the goods from which we can possibly get benefits but which are 
not presently on sale on an actual market — like most rights to pollute or to be protected 
from pollution — are just commodities for which a proper market has not yet been 
organised, apparently because the organising costs were prohibitive up to now. When 
Ronald Coase said that, in a world with zero transaction costs, farmers could buy 
protection against the sparking from trains passing their fields or, depending of the legal 
situation, railway companies could buy the right to damage their crops with their 
sparking, he suggested that in the real world the transaction costs for organising such 
markets were prohibitive to such a degree that these commodities look as if they were 
external to the market. For someone who thinks in such a way, anything — and especially 
any potential agreement — which can provide a benefit or avoid a nuisance can be 
considered as a potential commodity to eventually be sold on a potential market.  
 
Among the costs incurred by the smooth workings of the market, one has to make 
room for information costs. It is true that by paying more and more it is possible to 
increase the information available. And, with more information, not only more goods 
could be made available but better decisions could be made about them. Buyers and 
sellers may engage in more or less costly searches for information concerning identity of 
  7 
potential sellers and buyers or prices of commodities.5 Entrepreneurs can pay either an 
expert in a relevant domain or somebody who will retrieve useful information from 
libraries or other documentation centres. However, to increase information does not 
mean just getting the information which is already available in books or archives. When 
a company pays to get more information, it pays also for research. Such research tends 
naturally to include the discovery of new relevant knowledge which is usually just more 
difficult (and normally more costly) to attain than the knowledge which is currently 
available. When the detection of the ‘available’ knowledge requires sophisticated 
searching techniques and when the discovery of new knowledge supposes the gathering 
of various pieces of available knowledge, the difference between search and research 
becomes difficult to make. In this context, one can consider that all the possible 
knowledge which is to be discovered in future time is just made of commodities which 
can be acquired by incurring information costs which, of course, quickly become clearly 
prohibitive. When President Kennedy decided to put a man on the moon within ten years, 
he decided that the USA would incur the almost prohibitive cost of discovering the new 
knowledge required to realise such an ambitious project. 
 
Be that as it may, even a fully-informed economic agent has to take decisions based 
on computation and deliberation. The more important the amount of information 
available is, the more lengthy are the computations and deliberations required to take the 
best decision. But computation and deliberation have a cost. The costs to pay include 
money and time but also what Gary Becker once called a ‘psychic’ cost (Becker, 1976, p. 
7) since the stress caused by a long deliberation can easily exceed the money expenses 
involved. In any case, it is reasonable to think that by accepting to pay more and more in 
money, time and psychological stress, it is possible to increase the chance to reach a point 
which is closer and closer to an optimum given the constraints of the situation. For 
example, hiring a team of counsellors is probably an efficient way to take good decisions 
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and this is one of the means adopted by those who can incurred the cost involved, but this 
would be an excessive and inaccessible cost for most people who would be content 
instead simply to weigh the pros and cons of a decision.  
 
Thus, with these successive extensions of the notion of cost, virtually everything 
which happens in the world is integrated into an all-embracing market, but paradoxically 
enough the implications of this economic view of the world might be catastrophic for 
economic theory. Let me, from this point of view, consider successively transaction costs, 
deliberation costs and information costs.  
 
Nullifying the notion of the market?  
 
Inspired by Coase's paper on social cost, many economists proposed to extend the scope 
of transaction costs to let them include any possible cost which would be caused by the 
eventual transformation of any source of benefit into a marketable commodity. It is true 
that some pollution rights have even been implemented to deal with various situations 
and it is possible to negotiate them on a highly artificial market, but can we conclude 
from this that any benefit or any nuisance is marketable in principle with the help of 
similar devices? No doubt that Coase theorem is a splendid piece of theory, but, as 
constantly emphasised by its author, it works so well precisely because it postulates zero 
transaction costs. Paradoxically, the Theorem was the target of a considerable number of 
objections from those who overlook the fact that it claims to be valid only in a zero 
transaction cost world which, incidentally, is the ‘world of modern economic theory’ that 
Coase ‘was hoping to persuade economists to leave’.6 My own reservation in relation to 
Coase — or more precisely to some interpretations of Coase's analyses — goes precisely 
in the opposite direction. For Coasians, the temptation was great to assign an economic 
cost to every kind of potential transactions, and especially to transactions which would be 
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required to build up a market where there was no market to begin with. However, the 
concept of ‘cost’ is a concept which only has an economic meaning within the framework 
of the market; therefore, it cannot be used (except metaphorically) outside this 
framework. And building up a market is an activity which is typically performed outside 
a pre-existing market.  
 
 For example, would it be sensible to say that the right to pollute with sparking or 
anything else, or the right to be protected from pollution are just commodities whose 
price in the real world includes transaction costs whose prohibitive character is 
responsible for the fact that these commodities are not actually exchanged on a market? 
Such was the view held by Carl Dahlman (Dahlman, 1979), a disciple of Ronald Coase. 
Once transaction costs have been placed on the same footing as the more familiar 
production and transportation costs, it seems normal to raise the same question which is 
raised concerning these kinds of costs. Why incur these costs if they are themselves larger 
than the benefits to be derived from an eventual transaction? After all, you might dream 
of owning a Ferrari, but if you consider that its price (made up essentially from 
production costs) is so high than the benefits expected from owning such a car would be 
overwhelmed by the inconveniences of paying such a cost, you could decide not to realise 
this dream without concluding for this reason that this absence of transaction corresponds 
to a situation which is not optimal. Dahlman's central idea was to apply such a 
consideration to transaction costs. If you suffer from being polluted, you might be ready 
to pay a substantial amount for being delivered from this nuisance, but since there is no 
pre-existing market which offers you this possibility, you cannot realise this desire unless 
you accept to incur the extremely high costs (in campaigning, organising, monitoring, 
etc.) which are required to organise such a market. If, in this situation, you choose not to 
engage in such a costly enterprise because the required costs exceed your potential gains, 
  10 
there is no reason, according to Dahlman, not to conclude that the situation is optimal as it 
is.    
 
An odd consequence of this way of thinking is that, once all transactions costs have 
been taken into account, almost any static situation will look optimal.  If no transaction 
goes on to improve a situation, it is tempting to conclude that this is because the costs  of 
an eventual transaction (for example, the cost of organising and monitoring would-be 
transactors) added to the payment involved in those eventual transactions make it 
unprofitable. If, for example, the railway company persists in polluting the crops even 
when the nuisance to farmers is greater than the benefit obtained by the company from 
doing so, it is, in one sense, because the ‘transaction’ costs (the cost of organising a 
substantial number of farmers, forcing them to reveal their true preferences and collecting 
the amount required to convince the railway company to reduce its operations or to adopt 
a less polluting technique, etc.) would be so great that, added to the amount of the bribe 
payable to the company, it would exceed the potential benefit to the farmers. Any 
situation whatsoever is optimal since any improvement would be implemented were its 
costs — including transaction costs and costs of any other type — low enough to make it 
socially profitable. It was just such a conclusion that Mishan anticipated with 
apprehension when he wrote in 1971 a rather ironic paper entitled ‘Pangloss on Pollution’ 
(Mishan, 1971). The reference to Dr. Pangloss, the pleasant champion of ‘the best of all 
possible worlds’ in Voltaire's Candide, was meant to suggest how the inclusion of 
transaction costs can dramatically change the analysis of pollution and transform into an 
optimal situation what was until then considered to be one of the most serious challenges 
to economists' confidence in the virtues of the market.  
 
It might even be possible to push the matter still further by claiming that such an 
argument could make optimal any political situation whatsoever. Any dictatorial 
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government, even one particularly inimical to free market, could be justified by an 
extension of this argument apparently based on the functioning of the market. Dictatorial 
governments's activities interfere significantly with the consumption functions of its 
citizens by restricting their individual liberty. However, if the inconvenience suffered by 
these citizens was really that important, they could collectively bribe the government to 
reduce its liberty-limiting activities to an optimal amount. If they do not attempt to bribe 
the government, it is clearly because such transactions would involve costs (information 
costs, organisation costs, decision making costs and monitoring costs) which would be 
much higher than the benefits expected. Thus, paradoxically enough, it would make 
sense, according to this market view of the world, to characterise the situation in this 
dictatorial country as optimal as it is!7 Naturally, one might object to such an application 
of the transaction cost approach to a political (as opposed to an economic) situation. 
However, the actual relation between a railway company and the polluted farmers is not a 
typically economic relation and, consequently, it is not clear that alleged economic and 
political situations are really as different as they seem to be at first thought. As is well 
known, many prisoners do manage to bribe their jailers! And, after all, the application of 
economic analysis to political situations is, as is also well known, one of the major 
contributions of economic theory in recent decades. In any case, the goal of this 
comparison was not to suggest that political and economic situations are equivalent, but 
rather to dramatically illustrate that, if pushed to the limit, the overextension of the 
concept of cost destroys the very meaning of the concept of a market. If any kind of 
human interaction can be considered an optimal market situation, a market is no longer a 
particularly interesting structure.  
 
 
Let us now consider the case of deliberation costs which naturally include 
computation costs and other associated costs. If these costs were extended to include any 
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possible cost incurred by someone managing to improve the quality of a decision, any 
decision whatsoever might be considered rational and even optimal since any apparently 
irrational move could be presented as the best decision given the marginal cost of extra 
deliberation. Naturally, one could object that a decision which turns out to have 
disastrous consequences could have been avoided with not such a costly extra amount of 
deliberation, but, even in this case, if the extra deliberation were not engaged in, it would 
normally be due to the quite rational (if not well informed) assessment according to 
which the estimated cost (mostly psychological cost in this case) of such extra 
deliberation was estimated to be larger than the expected disutility of the adopted course 
of action. Frank Knight had already presented such a conclusion as self-evident as early 
as 1921: ‘It is evident that the rational thing to do is to be irrational, where deliberation 
and estimation cost more than they are worth’8 Many people (including very probably 
Frank Knight) may find that such a conclusion is not particularly catastrophic for 
economics, but it implies that optimisation itself turns out to be an almost contradictory 
notion since, in many situations which are far from being atypical, optimising implies 
refraining from optimising. Through an overextension of the notion of cost, the notion of 
optimisation (when all alleged costs are taken into account) loses its very meaning since, 
here again, any situation whatsoever might be presented as optimal, just because the cost 
required for arriving at a different and objectively more optimal situation was judged too 
high and, for this reason, sufficient to make the economically ‘optimal’ situation less 
optimal than the adopted one. 
 
What about information costs?9 Since optimisation, and especially long term 
optimisation, may require not only vast knowledge of the present situation but also some 
knowledge of the future, including some knowledge of the state of science and 
technology in the future, it is difficult to draw the line between the cost of information 
about the present and the future states of the world. Pushed to its limits, the idea of 
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extending this kind of cost to include any expenses related to the acquisition (including 
the discovery) of any kind of useful information would virtually reduce technical 
progress to a simple choice between techniques since the discovery of new techniques 
would be considered just a matter of cost which might of course be quickly judged 
prohibitive. In such an extreme situation, it would be the notion of long-term optimisation 
which would tend to lose its meaning since any situation whatsoever would be considered 
optimal, in some sense, even in the long term, once one takes into account the prohibitive 
cost of the investments in further research and investigations which would allow to reach 
more immediately the long term optimal position of economic models. More precisely, it 
is the notion of knowledge and the notion of time which would lose their meaning for 
economics since, by this overextension of the notion of cost, the difference between the 
known and the unknown, and the difference between the respective knowledge of 
different periods, would tend to vanish. As far as I know, no economist has ever adopted 
such an extravagant position. As a general rule, the frontier between the known and the 
still unknown, present knowledge and future knowledge, has been respected. Instead of 
being absurdly extended to include the cost of acquiring all possible knowledge, the 
notion of information cost has remained limited to the already quite extreme cost of 
(eventually) acquiring all the presently available (relevant) knowledge.  
 
Two notions of cost 
 
I would like to argue that a frontier of this kind should be established in the two other 
cases discussed above. Instead of including the cost of all possible deliberation which 
could be done in order to optimise the result of a decision, only the cost actually incurred 
by an optimiser who choose to pay for means to improve the quality of a decision which 
are offered on sale — like the eventual hiring of the services of counsellors available on 
the market — should be included in what counts as a cost when it comes to discussing the 
  14 
optimality of a decision. The estimated psychological cost of the extra deliberation which 
might have been made to reach a theoretical optimal point should not be considered when 
establishing this economically optimal point10. In proceeding this way, the notion of 
economic optimisation will find new life because it will no longer be true that any 
adopted position will be said to be optimal thanks to the accounting of these avoided 
psychological costs. Naturally, it would still be possible to say that it is preferable for any 
reason to adopt a position which is not optimal from the point of view of economic costs, 
but this sounds much more sensible than the view according to which any situation 
whatsoever could be said to be optimal.  
 
It seems still more important to apply the same idea to transaction costs. Only actual 
transactions or actual negotiations to obtain a commodity which is available on some 
market should be considered as transaction costs. The cost of convincing a dictatorial 
government to change his mind is not an economic cost not because we are dealing with 
political matters but because there is no such thing as an available market for ways of 
governing. In political contexts, where power is held by the Mafia and where the price to 
pay for obtaining such and such decisions or such and such rights is fixed and well 
known, it would be quite correct to present as an economic cost the bribe or the ‘tax’ 
needing to be paid to obtain something. The problem with Dahlman's interpretation of 
Coase's views is not that they are applied to a domain which does not concern economics 
but that it refers to the creation of commodities which do not exist on an actual market. 
The problem is also that it suggests that buying such commodities is just a matter of 
negotiations similar to those which (at least implicitly) go on in any transaction. We must 
refrain from overextending the notion of the cost of transaction; not everything 
everything is a commodity, not every human relation is a market relation and not every 
situation where people refrain from searching new transactions is an optimal situation. 
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While it may be true that ‘there is no such thing as a free lunch’, it is not true that every 
kind of lunch is available and for sale on the market. 
 
* *  * 
 
To conclude, I would like to observe that the psychological (and moral) notion of a 
sacrifice should be distinguished from the  economic notion of a cost; the same goes for 
the notion of harm. Any human activity requires sacrificing something and is thus 
harmful from some point of view, but it is not true that anything which is sacrificed in 
such a context can be exchanged on a market. It sounds more fruitful to say that there is 
no economics without some form of actual — and not only metaphorical — market. 
Once they are separated from the context of a market — a place where real commodities 
are really exchanged — economic concepts, and especially the concept of cost, tend to 




                                               
1 The author would like to thank, Bruce Maxwell, Philippe Mongin and Richard Sturn 
for their very useful comments. Financial assistance from the SSHRC (Ottawa) and 
the Fonds FCAR (Quebec) was also greatly appreciated. 
2 The idea that information has a cost which explains that people can rationally decide 
to stop their search for information was clearly discussed by Stigler in (Stigler, 1961). 
3 As is well known, Herbert Simon developed the idea of a bounded rationality through 
most of his works; for a survey with an accent on the concept of deliberation cost, see 
(Conlisk,1996), for example, pp. 671 and ff. 
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4 The literature on transaction costs and on internalisation of externalities through 
negotiations has been extremely abundant since the publication by Ronald Coase of 
his seminal paper (Coase, 1960). For a useful critical survey, see (Medema & Zerbe, 
2000).  
5 (Stigler, 1961). For an interesting discussion of the relations between Stigler's 
analysis and Simon's views on bounded rationality and costs related to deliberation, 
see (Mongin, 1986).  
6 (Coase, 1988, p. 174); quoted by (Medema, 1995), pp. 1043 who frequently 
emphasises and documents this crucial fact. 
7 I have discussed such an example in relation with Coase's theorem and Dahlman's 
paper in ‘Learning from the debate on Externalities’ in (Backhouse and alia, 1998, 
pp. 120-147). 
8 Knight Frank, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, 1921, quoted by (Conlisk, 1996, p. 686) ;  
9 In some sense, information costs raise a problem similar to the one raised by 
deliberation costs, since one can argue that any situation is optimal given that the 
marginal cost of information is too high to justify further inquiry, but this effect is 
subordinated to the limitation of deliberation (which requires information). So I will 
consider here only the effect of overextending the notion of information costs per se 
(i.e., concerning the cost of information over all possible knowledge).  
10 Jon Elster made a point which is akin to this when he denied that bounded rationality 
can be reduced to maximisation once the information costs (or more properly the 
deliberation costs) are taken into account. See (Elster, 1979, p. 136). 
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